Taken together, our data may be interpreted as suggesting that the human facility in understanding observed social relationshipsis provided by the combined activity of an action recognition system in the inferior frontal and superior temporal cortices, an anterior STS system that interprets the social significance of actions, and a dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and medial parietalcortex system that analyzes social relationships and considers their implications.The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and medialparietal cortex system for thinking about social relationships is apparently part of the brain’s default state circuitry; it may continuously, often without effort or intention, assess and analyze past, present, or possible future social relationships whenever non-social tasks do not demand full attention. Given the complexity and pervasive importance of social relationships, this ongoing social processing may be crucial to sustaining adaptive social relations.
I also speculated that these neurons can not only help simulate other people's behavior but can be turned "inward"—as it were—to create second-order representations or meta-representations of your own earlier brain processes. This could be the neural basis of introspection, and of the reciprocity of self awareness and other awareness. There is obviously a chicken-or-egg question here as to which evolved first, but... The main point is that the two co-evolved, mutually enriching each other to create the mature representation of self that characterizes modern humans."
Investigations of brain substrates for social cognition have polarized in two camps. The simulation camp focuses on so-called shared circuits (SCs) that are involved in one’s own actions, sensations and emotions and in perceiving those of others [1,2]. The theory of mind (ToM) camp emphasizes the role of midline structures in mentalizing about the states of others .
An embryonic and speculative working hypothesis  for the link between classical SCs and midline structures, which is inspired by these findings but differs from that in Uddin et al. ,is shown in Figure 1. While dealing with states of the self, areas of the SCs represent pre-reflective bodily states. If asked to introspect and report these states, subjects additionally activate (v)mPFC structures. When dealing with states of other individuals, activity in SCs might represent the empathic transformation of the bodily states of others into pre-reflective neural representations of similar states of the self. These simulated pre-reflective representations correlate with empathy [6–8] and might provide an intuitive understanding of what goes on in others . If asked to reflect on the states of others, the pathways that are normally used to reflect on the bodily representations of the self are now used on simulated bodily states of others, leading to simulated reflective representations.Thus, SCs and midline structures form an integrated system that applies to cases where we perceive the other as similar enough for simulation to be useful . In this view, both SCs and vmPFC reflect simulation, albeit at different levels (pre-reflective versus reflective), rather than radically different processes (SC versus ToM). This route is complemented by a more dorsal, less embodied and more cognitive route that becomes essential when simulations lead to wrong conclusions (e.g. others considered to be dissimilar in this aspect
Selv om jeg ikke er sikker på at jeg helt forstår modellen, er ideen klar nok, og den korresponderer smukt med V. Ramachandrans overvejelser: Der er to niveauer hvor det ene har udviklet sig oven på det andet - som en form for intern reflekterende simulation med afsæt i det som spejlneuronerne skaber af interne ubevidste emotionelle identifikationsprocesser.